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An auxiliary service unit is normally idle, or in cold
standby. If a demand for the unit's service occurs, the unit
must be available to satisfy it, or else "catastrophe" occurs.
Policies for periodic inspection and maintenance of such a unit
are derived in this paper that maximize the expected time until a
catastrophe occurs. The policies recognize that inspection,
maintenance, and repair periods are of non-zero duration, during
which the unit is vulnerable. They also account for the possi-
bility of hazardous inspection that may damage the unit, and
various forms of imperfect repair.
Important examples occur in the nuclear power industry: a
unit may be a pump, or emergency diesel generator, and a demand
may be caused by an initiating event such as pipe break or loss
of off site power; "catastrophe" equates to loss-of coolant acci-
dent or melt down. Other examples occur in the military, and in
emergency services to hospitals.
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It is common practice to improve the reliability of a system
by installing cold standby units, which are only brought into
operation when a standard operating system fails. In particu-
lar, diesel generators in cold standby may be used to scram a
reactor in case of a coolant pipe breaking or some other failure
in a nuclear power plant. Other examples occur in hospital
power supplies and military hardware. If such a standby system
fails to operate when it is required, then the consequences could
be catastrophic. The times when there is a need for the standby
unit are called initiating events. If the standby system is in
a failed state, when an initiating event occurs, then a catas-
trophic event is said to occur.
It is necessary to inspect and maintain the standby system
from time to time. If inspection reveals it to be in an unsatis-
factory state, repairs are made. The idea is that the standby
unit can go down even when it is not operating and this will
cause it to fail to operate the next time it is needed.
The following policy has been proposed for the inspection of
diesel generators in a reactor. After a generator is found to
be down on inspection and is repaired, it undergoes K inspections
at short intervals of time. If it is found to be up at each of
these short inspections, then it is inspected at long intervals
thereafter until it is found to be down. Whenever a generator
is found to be down and is repaired, inspections start with the
K short inspection intervals again. This type of inspection
policy reflects the idea that after the system is repaired it
should be inspected more often for awhile to ensure it was re-
paired correctly. In Section 2 we present a model for this
inspection policy and derive an expression for the expected time
to a catastrophic event.
In Sections 3 through 5 we will use various Markov decision
and renewal theoretic formulations of the problem to investigate
the forms of the optimal inspection policies which maximize the
expected time until a catastrophic event occurs. This will show
us how certain assumptions about inspection and repair of the
standby system affect the form of the inspection policy.
Almost all the previous work on inspecting a single standby
unit uses a cost criterion. Barlow and Proschan [2] described
the basic average cost per unit time model with accurate instan-
taneous inspection and faultless repair, while Luss and Kander
[9] allowed for non-zero inspection times. Wattanapanom and
Shaw [20] studied the problem when inspection is hazardous, so
that it is possible for the inspection to cause the unit to fail.
Nakagawa [11] looked at the probability that at an initiating
event the standby system will work, while Butler [3J maximized
the expected lifetime of the standby unit, but did not allow re-
pairs. His model allowed the standby unit to be in more than one
'up' state, which are distinguishable only upon inspection. This
connects with the work on partially observable Markov decision
processes [1,10,16], and in particular the problem of optimal
inspection and repair of a deteriorating process with imperfect
information introduced by Ross [13] and generalized by White [21]
,
Rosenfield [12] / Luss [8] , Sengupta [15] , Suzuki [17] , and Wong
[19]. In these papers, a system can be in more than one state,
but which one is known only imperfectly or upon inspection.
Our models of the inspection and repair of the standby sys-
tem allow for non-zero inspection-maintenance times and non-zero
repair periods, but we ignore the time the unit is in use. The
idea is that during inspection-maintenance and repair the unit
can not react to an initiating event and so these are critical
times for the system, whereas we make the assumption that the
time the standby system is actually in use is so small it can be
neglected. We also allow for imperfect repair and hazardous
inspection, so that even if the unit is up on inspection, it
might be down immediately after. Thus we explicitly represent
possible mistakes in inspection, and allow for incorrectly iden-
tifying the unit as working when in fact it was down. Another
model considered allows the unit to be in one of two 'up' states,
which are indistinguishable on inspection, but have different
failure rates. This is intended to incorporate the idea that a
repair might put right the superficial cause of the unit's failure,
but not deal with the underlying problem, which will recur.
In Section 3, we introduce our basic discrete time models
where the unit can only be either 'up' or 'down'. The times
between initiating events are assumed to have a geometric distri-
bution. We describe the case where successfully dealt with
initiating events are recorded as showing the unit was working
at that time. By modelling this as a Markov decision process
we can find the form of the optimal inspection policy to maximize
expected time to a catastrophic event. We compare this with the
case where we ignore any information from successfully dealt
with initiating events. We also look at the expected times until
a catastrophic event under different policies, and optimize the
probability that the system will last at least a fixed number
of time periods. Section 4 describes the equivalent continuous
time model and shows how the discrete time results are replicated
if the lifetime of the unit is exponential and the initiating
events occur according to a Poisson process. We also investi-
gate the optimal inspection policy for general lifetime distribu-
tions. Section 5 generalizes the discrete time model to allow
the unit to be in two 'up 1 states. In certain cases the optimal
inspection policy for this model has quite short inspection
periods immediately after a repair, which then lengthen as
further inspections suggest the system is in the "better" up
state.
2. CONTINUOUS TIME MODEL WITH TWO-UP STATES AND SHORT-LONG
INSPECTION POLICY
Assume the system can be in one of two up-states j = 1,2
until it fails. The two up-states are indistinguishable upon
inspection. After a repair the system goes to up-state j with
probability tt . and remains there until it fails. After a repair
the conditional distribution of the time to failure given it is
in up-state j is G., independent of the past.
After a repair the system is inspected and maintained at K
short intervals of length S. If the system is found to be up
at each of the K short inspection intervals, then future inspec-
tions occur at long intervals of length L > S. If the system is
found to be down upon inspection, it is repaired and then in-
spected at K short inspection intervals again before the long
inspection intervals begin. If the ^system is found to be up
upon inspection, routine maintenance is performed. Given the
system is in up-state j , the conditional distribution of the
time to failure after an inspection is F., independent of the
past. Some reasonable and tractable examples of distributions
F. and G. are the exponential, and the exponential with a proba-
bility atom at the origin reflecting hazardous inspection or
faulty repair.
Inspection-maintenance takes M units of time and repair
takes R units of time. Initiating events occur according to a
Poisson process with rate v. The system is unable to respond
to an initiating event during inspection-maintenance or repair.
A catastrophic event is said to occur if an initiating event
occurs when the system has failed or is being inspected,
maintained, or repaired. Let T denote the time of the first
catastrophic event. We will derive an expression for the ex-
pected value of T.
Let f(j,k) = E. ,[T] denote the expected time to the first
3 / K
catastrophic event given k = 0,1,..., K short inspection periods
have already successfully taken place and the system is in up-
state j. Let f(j,£) = E. „ [T] denote the expected time to first
catastrophic event given a successful inspection has just taken
place, the next inspection period is long, and the system is
in up-state j
.
A probabilistic argument gives the following system of
equations; (F. (S) = 1 - F.(S)).
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+ / F. (du)e"v(L
-U+R) [L+R+ I TT.f(j,0)]
J j=l :
After some simplification, equations (2.1) -(2. 3) become
f(j,0) = a
Q
(j,S) + p (j,S)f (j,l) + c (j,S)TTf (0) ; (2.4
for 1 < k < K-l
f(j,k) = a(j,S) + p(j,S)f(i,k+l) + c(j,S)7rf (0) ; (2.5)
f(j,A) = a(j,L) + p(j,L)f (j,£) + c(j,L)7Tf(0) (2.6)
where
2
7Tf(0) = I 7T.f(j,0) ;
j=l 3
P (j,S) = G.(S)e~vM ; (2.7)
c
/• o\ -v(S+R) r vu _ , , . ,~ ONc
n (] / S) = e j e G.(du) ; (2.8)
a
Q
(j,S) = i [1 - P Q (j,0) - c (j,0)] (2.9)
S
+ G. (S)S + / uG. (du) ;
: :
p(j,t) = F.(t)e VM ; (2.10)
c(j,t) = e"V(t+R) f evu u) . {2mll)
J
a(j,t) = i [1 - p(j,t) - c(j,t)] (2.12)
t
+ F. (t)t + / u F. (du) . (2.12)
: 3
In the special case in which F . has an exponential distri-







[1-e ^ ] if t >
then
-6 .t
p(j,t) = a.e J e VM (2.13)
c(j,t) = e V ^+K > (i-a ) + a ^-J^[l-e ] (2.14)
J
a(j,t) = ^ [l-p(j,t) - c(j,t)] (2.15)
, -6 .t
+ a.
-F- [1-e J ]
Solving equations (2.4)- (2.6) recursively leads to the
following expression for the expected time to the first cata-
strophic event given the system has just been repaired
nf(0, = = (2 . 16
where
NUM = I TT.[a (j,S) + p () (j / S)gN (K-l) ] (2.17)
where
K-l
a fK_ n _ [1-P(j/S) ] ,. » ,. S) K-1 a(j,L) , , 8gN ( 1) - l- p (j /S ) a U/S) + pd,S) i-p (j /L ) ' ^.isj
2
DEN = J ll^ll-{c (j,&)+ p (j,S)gD (K-l)}] (2.19)




K-l c(j,L) (2 2Q)gD 1 ^ X; l-p(j,S) c U#t>; +Pl],bj l-p(j,L) U.^WJ
EXAMPLE. The rate of initiating events is v = 0.1 per week.
tt = 0.9 = 1 - tt The length of an inspection-maintenance
period M is —'-=— weeks. A repair period, R, is ' weeks.
Fj(t) =
Gj(t) =
if t < ,
-6 .t




(1-OKR) + OKR[l-e 3 ] if t >
9 1Assume 6, = j^q per week, 6« = ~- per week. Note that after a
repair the conditional expected time to system failure given the
system is up is 7r n •=— + tt„ -p— = 26 weeks. Thus, if after alo, z o
^
repair, no inspections are done, then the expected time to a
catastrophic event is (OKR) (26) + - = (OKR) (26) + 10 weeks.
An exploratory numerical study was conducted of the best
values of S, L, and K for various values of OKI, OKR. We
restricted our attention to the case in which inter-inspection
periods are in integer numbers of weeks. Equations (2 . 16)
-
( 2 . 20)
were evaluated numerically for various parameter values. Some





OKI OKR Best S Best K Best L TTf (0) no inspections
0.9 0.9 1 2 2 69.24 33.4
0.5 0.5 oo - - 23 23
0.5 0.9 9 1 1 38.39 33.4
0.9 0.5 1 1 3 or 4 50.63 23
If the quality of the repair is better than the quality of
inspection (OKR > OKI) then it appears to be better not to in-
spect often initially after a repair but then to inspect more
often as time goes on. If OKI > OKR then it appears to be
better to inspect soon after a repair and if the system is up
at inspection not to inspect for a longer period of time
thereafter. If both repair and inspection are of poor quality
then it appears to be better not to do anything. Note that the
expected time to a catastrophe seems to be more sensitive to
OKI than to OKR.
In the remainder of the paper we will study optimal inspec-
tion policies.
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3. DISCRETE TIME, ONE-UP-STATE, MARKOV DECISION PROCESS MODELS
MODEL 1
In the first model, the standby unit can either be 'up' or
'down 1 , when it is not in operation; and, if n basic time periods
e.g., days, have elapsed since the unit was installed, s is
the probability that it will be 'up' at the next time period
given that it is 'up' in this (the n ) time period. Once the
unit goes 'down' it remains 'down' until either it is success-
fully repaired or else a catastrophic initiating event occurs.
Each time period, the operator can inspect the unit, repair it,
or do nothing. If the inspection finds the unit is 'up', no
repairs are made, but there is a probability (1-i) that the
inspection was actually hazardous or damaging, and so the unit
is 'down' immediately after inspection. An inspection which
finds the unit up takes M periods, where M need not be integer;
during this period the unit cannot respond to an initiating event
If, on inspection, the unit is found in the down state, a repair
is attempted, which with probability r will return the unit to
the 'up' state and with probability (1-r) leaves it in the down
state; this takes a total time of R periods to perform (R >_ M) ;
again the unit cannot respond to an initiating event during this
period. If the operator decides on a repair without inspection,
the unit is again out of operation for R periods and has proba-
bility r of being in the 'up' state immediately afterwards,
irrespective of whether it was up or down before the repair.
An initiating event, i.e., one that demands the standby
unit's services, occurs at random with probability 3 each period,
12
i.e., according to a Bernoulli trials process, so the times
between events are independent and geometric. In this model we
assume the operator is aware of those initiating events, to which
the standby unit responded satisfactorily. This implies the
unit was 'up' at that time, and although we neglect the time
it was in operation, we say there is a (1-c) chance that its use will
have caused it to go down by the end of the period. So if it was used
the n period after the unit was installed, there is a probability
c, that it will be 'up' at the next period. (If c = 1, use is
not hazardous.) If the standby system is down or is being
inspected or repaired when an initiating event occurs, a cata-
strophic event occurs. The objective is to maximize the expected
number of periods until a catastrophic event occurs .
The situation described can be treated as an infinite-state
Markov decision process. The state space is describable as
S = { (p,n) , <_ p <_ 1, n = 1,2,...} where p is our belief that
the unit is 'up* this period, and n is the number of periods
since the standby unit was installed. There are three actions
open to us at each state— do nothing, inspect or repair. Let
V(p,n) be the maximum expected number of periods until a cata-
strophic event, given that this is the n period since installa-
tion, and p is our belief at this time that the unit is 'up'.
Standard dynamic programming arguments [14] show that V(p,n)
satisfies the optimality equation.











1 (p / n)





(p,n) = p[(l-(l-e) M)/e + (l-3) MV(i,n+M)
]
+ (1-p) [(l-(l-3) R)/e + (l-3) P'V(r,n+R)]
W
3 (p / n) = (l-(l-g)
R)/3 + (l-8) RV(r,n+R)
Note that
(l-(l-3) M)/3 = 3 + 23(1-3) + 33d-3) 2 + ... + M(1-3) M 1
is the expected number of periods to pass, up to a maximum of
M, until an initiating event occurs. W.(p,n) represents the
payoff from an action; for example W, (p,n) corresponds to doing
nothing, where with probability (1-3) no demand occurs, while
with probability 3p an initiating event is successfully dealt
with and with probability (1-p) 3 a. catastrophic event occurs.
(3.1) is an example of Denardo ' s contraction operator approach
to dynamic programming [4] , and hence the optimal policy is inde-
pendent of the past history of the system and consists of
inspecting in state (p,n) if W„(p,n) > max{W, (p,n), W^(p,n)}
repairing if W~(p,n) > max{W, (p,n) , W
?
(p,n) }, otherwise doing
nothing.
As there is a probability 3(1 - max{s, }) of a catastrophic
k K
event within two periods from any state and under any policy,
14
we have
1/3 < V(p,n) 2/3(1 -max(sj ) . (3.2)
k K
It is easier to work with V(p,n) = V(p / n) - 1/3, which is the
expected extra time until a catastrophic event because there
is a standby unit. (3.1) then becomes
V(p,n) = max{W




(p f n) = p + (1-3) V(s np,n+1) + 3pV(c,n+l)
W
2
(p,n) = p(l-3) MV(i,n+M) + ( 1-p) (1-3 ) ^(r , n+R)
W
3
(p,n) = (l-3) RV(r / n+R)
Lemma 3.1.
If s are non-increasing in n then V(p,n) is convex and
nondecreasing in p, and non-increasing in n.
Proof . Apply value iteration to solve (3.3); the iterates
V (p,n) satisfy
m ^ 2
p + (l-B)V (s p,n+l) + 3pV (c,n+l)^ m n^ m
V , (p,n) = max <p(l-3) M VJi,n+H) + (l-pMl-gF V(r,n+R)
m+l \ m m
(1-3) R V
m




(p,n) = for all p and n, which is convex and non-
decreasing in p and non-increasing in n. Since the sum of
convex functions, and the maximum of convex functions is convex,
if V (p,n) is convex for all p and n so is V tl (p,n) . Thusm ^ ^ m+ 1 *
by induction V (p,n) is convex in p and since by [14 ]
,
V (.,.) converges to V(. / .) the solution of (3.3), this limit
function is also convex in p.
Again notice that if V (p,n) is non-decreasing in p for all
n, so is p + (1-3)V (s p,n+l) + 3pVm (c,n+l) since V (.,.) >
and also max{p( 1-3) MV
m
(i,n+M) + (l-p)(l-3)R V (r ,n+R ) , (1-3)R V (r,n-tf*)>
is non-decreasing in p. Hence V , (p,n) , the maximum of these
two non-decreasing functions, is non-decreasing and the induction
step goes through. In the limit as m -* «> this proves V(p,n)
is non-decreasing in p.
For the dependence of V(p,n) on n, we again use induction
in the iterates V (p,n) : notice that (3.4) implies
V
m+ l ( P'
n)
" WP' n+1) >
j





(i,n+i+M)) + ( 1-p) ( 1-3 ) K (V
m
(r ,n4-R)






Assume V (p,n) > V (p,n+l) for all p and n, then the fact
m ^' — m ^' ^




(snP/ n+ l) - Vm (sn+1 p,n+ 2) (Vm (
s
n








n+lp ' n+1) " ^m (sn+lp ' n+2) } - ° ' (3 * 6)
Hence (3.5) gives v
m+ ]_(P/ n )
_ v
+1 (p#n+l) > for all p and n,
and the induction hypothesis holds. Thus, the limit function
V(p,n) is also non-increasing in n.
These results help to describe the optimal policy.
Theorem 3 .
1
The optimal policy is given by a set of numbers p ,
n = 1,2,... where, n periods after installing the standby
system, one does nothing in state (p,n) if p > p ;
inspects if p < p* and (1-3)^(1,11) (l-B) R V(r,n) ; and
repairs if p < p* and (1-3) MV(i ,n) < (1-3)R V (r ,n) . Notice if
i > r, then one never repairs as (1-3) v(i,n) > (1-3) V(r,n)
for all n.
Proof . Notice that if (l-3) MV(i,n) > (1-3) RV(r ,n) , then W
2 (p f n) >W 3 (p,n)
for all p; otherwise W (p,n) >_ W„(p,n). Now look at
{p|W, (p,n) <_ max {W.(p,n)}}, which is the set of states (p,n)
1 i=2,3 x
where it is not best to do nothing. Since both W„(p,n) and
W..(p,n) are linear in p and V(p,n) is convex, we get for any
















where i = 2 or 3 depending on which is the maximum. Hence (3.7)
implies max W. ( Ap,+ (1-Ap
2
) •> W, ( Ap, + (1-A) p 2 ) and so the region
where it is not best to do nothing is convex.
From (2.3) we have
V(0,n) = max{ (l-3)V(0,n+l)
, ( 1-3) RV (r ,n+R) } . (3.8)
If it were best to do nothing at p = , this would imply
V(0,n) = (1-3) V(0,n+1) , which contradicts V(p,n) is non-
increasing in n. Hence (0,n) is in the convex region where
it is not best to do nothing. Let p be the maximum value of p
in this region and the result holds.
In fact the model can be rewritten so that the state space
is countable, since not all possible values of p are possible.
Let S = { (m,x,n) ,m = 0,1,2,..., x = i, r or c, n = 1,2,3}
where (m,x,n) is the state when the unit is n periods since
installation and m periods since the end of the last inspection,
repair or successful response to an initiating event; x = i if
this last occurrence was an inspection that found it up; x = r
if it was a repair and x = c, if it was a successfully dealt
with initiating event. The probability p that the unit is up
m





p(m,x,n) + (1-6) V(m+l,x,n+l)
+ 3p (m,x,n) V(0,c,n+1) ;
V(m,x,n) = max <. p (m,x ,n) ( 1-3)V(0 , i ,n+M) (3.9)




and the optimal policy of Theorem 3.1 can be reinterpreted.
Corollary 3.1 ;
If, at n periods after installation, an initiating event
is successfully dealt with, inspect or repair next in T (n)
periods unless there is another initiating event before then;
if at n periods after installation, the unit has just been found
to be 'up' on inspection, inspect or repair next in T. (n)
periods unless an initiating event occurs; if at n periods after
installation the unit has just finished a repair, then inspect
or repair in T (n) periods unless a prior initiating event
occurs. If i > r one always inspects, otherwise the repair
or inspect decision depends on the number of periods since
installation.
Proof. This is just a matter of pointing out that










n+1 ...sn+k < pn+k } ,
19
*T (n) = min{k rs s
1
,«--s ,, < p ,.}.
r , ' n n+1 n+k ^n+kk
Notice that T (n) , T. (n) , T (n) reflects the ordering of
w -L Jl
c, i and r, so if c > i r then T (n) >_ T. (n) > T|n) , etc.
The dependence of this policy on n follows because the
failure rate (1-s ) is age-dependent. We would expect that if
s decreases with n, and consequently the failure rate is in-
creasing, then T (n) , T. (n) and T (n) will also be non-increasing
w -L XT
in n. This reflects the fact that in the long run, the aging
of the unit will lead to more frequent inspections. At the
moment we are more interested in the effect of inspections and
repair before aging starts to play a part. The interesting
decision to replace an aging unit will not be analyzed at this
time. From now on, assume that the failure rate is constant,
which leads to the following simplification of Model 1.
Model 2
Assume s = s for all n in Model 1, and c = i. This corres-
n
ponds to thinking of an initiating event successfully dealt
with as an inspection which takes zero time. The state space




+ (l-3)V(m+l,x) + gxsm V(0,i) ;
r
xs
m (l-3) M V(0,i) + (l-xsm ) (1-3) R V(0,r); (3.10)
(1-3) R V(0,r) .
20
and the optimal policy is either of the form tt.(T.,T ) or
tt (T. ,T ); tt.(T.,T ) means inspect T. periods after a success-
ful response to an initiating event and T. periods after the
end of an inspection or T periods after the end of a repair,
unless another initiating event occurs, whereupon inspect if
T. more periods elapse without another initiating event.
tt (T.,T ) means repair T. periods after a successfully-dealt-
with initiating event, or T periods after last repair, unless
another initiating event, or T periods after last repair,
unless another initiating event occurs. Notice that one either
always inspects or always repairs depending on the values of
(1-3)^(0,1) and (l-3)R V(0,r) .
Although the state space is infinite we can apply variants
of policy iteration and value iteration which solve the Markov
decision process to find the optimal policy and optimal expected
time to a catastrophic event. For any policy tt . (T.,T ) there
are only T. + T +2 states the unit can be in. So for, any
* 1 r J
expected policy we can calculate the corresponding expected
time. Since the problem is equivalent to one with discount
factor (1-3 (1-s)), we can apply the bounds in White [22] to
find a finite state approximation, whose value is within any
prescribed amount of the optimal value. These bounds tell us
how many states (m,x) we need to consider. The results given
in Table 2 are the optimal policy and optimal expected time for
different values of 3, i, r, s, M and R , together with the
expected times under other policies. The numbers we have chosen
reflect an underlying model, in which inspections can be scheduled
21
at discrete times, say at multiples of a week. However, a
repair or inspection takes only a fraction of this time. Al-
though our theory was worked out for integer inspection and
repair times, we take the same formula to approximate non-
integer times. The inspection policy tt.(1,0) means inspect
one period after last inspection or last initiating event and
immediately after a repair, while tt (0,100+) means repair
immediately after any initiating event or at least 100 periods
(100+) after a repair.
Notice the optimal policy is almost insensitive to whether
3 = 0.05 or 0.01 and the expected time to a catastrophic event
is affected more by increases in i than r or even s. The
policy tt . (n,0) to inspect immediately after a repair is optimal
if the probability of a repair not being effective is quite
high, say 0.4. Similarly, the model suggests one should not
inspect i.e., tt (.,.) if inspection is more hazardous than
repair, i < r.
MODEL 3.
We might want to change our criterion from maximizing ex-
pected time until a catastrophic event to maximizing the proba-
bility that the system lasts at least n periods until a
catastrophic event. This might be the case if the unit is to
be completely replaced after n periods. If we apply this
criterion to Model 2, P (p) the probability that the system lasts
at least n periods before a catastrophic event, given we believe
it is 'up' at present with probability p, satisfies the
22
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= 1 for all p.
(l-3)P
n
(sp) + gp Pn (i)
P
n+1 (p) = max<; P (l-3)
M
P






where M = min(M,n+l) , N = min(R,n+l) . The optimal policy is
again of a control-limit type.
Theorem 3.2.
The optimal policy to maximize the probability of lasting
n periods is given by the sequence p, ,p 7 ,...p / where with k
periods to go, do nothing if p > p, , inspect or repair if
p < p*; repair if (l-3)
FhM p
n+1_N (r) 1 Pn+1-M (i) ' and ins Pect
otherwise.
Proof . As in Theorem 3.1, prove by induction that P (p) is
convex and non-decreasing in p and non-increasing in n. The
convexity of P (p) and the linearity of the second two terms
in the maximization in (3.11) then gives the result.
If the state space is changed to S = {(m,x), m = 0,l,2,...,x = i
or r), by noting p = xs at (m,x) , the obvious change occurs in
the optimal policy. In Table 3 we compare the maximum
chance of lasting n periods before a catastrophic event for
*
n = 10 , 50 and 200 with the same chance under the policy it
that maximizes the expected time to a catastrophic failure.
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These figures are similar to those given for Model 2 except
that the length of period is 1/10 of that there. So we can
think of the probabilities as those of lasting 10, 50 or 100
weeks without a catastrophic failure. The optimal policy for




Suppose any information derived from having successfully
dealt with initiating events, as in Model 2, were ignored;
what changes would occur? We can no longer model this as a
Markov decision process period by period since in these we cannot
ignore information we know. However, we can construct a renewal
theory model, for each end of inspection or end of repair is
a type of renewal point. Thus we can define V. , V as the maxi-
mum expected time to a catastrophic event starting immediately
after a repair V or an inspection V. . The rest of the model
is the same as Model 2, with i, r, s, M, R having the same
meaning as there. The optimality equation is then
T
.
V. = max(L.(T.) + is 1 ( (1- (1-3) M ) /3 + (1-3) M V.)i T i i i
i
+ Pi




V = max / L (T ) + rs r ( ( 1- ( 1-3) M ) /3 + d~3) M V.)
























where L (T) = T - £ [1-ps
1
] [1- ( 1-3 )
1
] is the expected number
p i=0
of periods, up to a maximum of T until a catastrophic event
occurs, if p is the probability the unit is up at the start
T-l




is the probability that after T periods the unit is down but
no catastrophic event has occurred given that initially it was
up with probability x and down with probability 1-x. Again it
is easier to work with V = V - 1/3 and the arguments of Markovxx ^
renewal programming [7] r show that the optimal policy is either
tt.(T.,T ), i.e., inspect T. after last inspection and T after1 1 r * v
-l
r r
last repair, or tt (W ), i.e., repair W after last repair.
Using (3.12) we can calculate V., V under these policies. For
tt . (T. ,T )1 1 r
.
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We calculate the optimal policy for the examples we did in
Model 2, and so it is useful to compare the results with those
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There are no great changes in the maximum time until a
catastrophic event. Notice that there are examples where model
5 has a longer expected time. This may seem strange at first,
since in Model 5, we are ignoring information— the occurrence
of a successfully dealt with initiating event—which we use in
Model 2. However to counterbalance this, in Model 5, it is
implicit that after a successfully dealt with initiating event,
the stand-by system is bound to be up, while in Model 2, it is
only up with probability i. This also explains the difference
in policy for the fourth example. Since repair and inspection
are so bad, we do nothing to interfere with it under Model 5,
but in Model 2 because after each successfully dealt with
initiating event there is only a .5 chance it is up, we must
keep inspecting it to see if this has occurred. Otherwise the
only difference in policies is that the inspection intervals are
slightly longer in Model 5 than in Model 2.
29
4. CONTINUOUS TIME MODEL WITH ONE UP STATE
In this section we look at the continuous time analogue of
the standby unit model described in Section 3. Again, the
standby unit can be either 'up' or 'down 1 , and remains down
either until it is inspected and repaired, or until a catastrophic
initiating event occurs. An inspection takes a time of M, and
if the unit works on inspection, nothing is done, and the life-
time of the unit thereafter is given by the distribution function
F. (•) • The repair of a unit, found to be 'down* on inspection,
takes, altogether with the inspection, a time of R and the
lifetime distribution function thereafter is F (•)• (The discrete
r
time models have distribution functions corresponding to a point
mass at zero together with a geometric distribution.) The times
of the initiating events are given by a Poisson process with
parameter v, (so average inter-initiating event time is v ).
Again, we think of an initiating event that finds the unit up
as the equivalent of an inspection. The problem is to find the
times between inspections and between a repair and the next
inspection which maximizes the expected time until a catastrophic
event.
From the work of Doshi [5] on continuous time Markov deci-
sion processes, it follows that the optimal policy has a deterministic
time T. between inspections and a deterministic time T , between
l r r
a repair and the next inspection. Moreover, if V., (V ) are the
maximum expected time to a catastrophic event starting after
an inspection (repair)




x _ -vT -vT
V = sup{ / ve (t+.F (t)V.)dt+T e X + [e F (T )




vtdt+Me-vM + e-vM V.)]+e x F (T ) ( / tve"vtdt1 x X
+ Re~ vR+ e" vRV
r
)} (4.1)
where F(t) = 1 - F(t) and x = i or r. The T. and T that
l r
actually maximize the R.H.S. of (4.1) are the optimal inspec-
tion times. Again, it is simpler to work with V = V - 1/v
,
which is the improvement in expected time until a catastrophic
event when there is a standby system, over when there is no
standby system. If V.(T.,T ), V (T.,T ) are these improvements
starting from an inspection and from a repair, when inter-
inspection time is T. and T is the time from repair to an£- l r
inspection, we get by rearranging (4.1) that
T
x -vT
V (T.,T ) = / e" VtF (t)dt + V.(T.,T )[e Xe vM F (T )
x i' r
n
J x l l r xx
T
x ~ _ -vT
+ / ve
Vt F(t)dt] +V (T.,T )e VRe ^CT) (4.2)
_.' x rir js.x
Solving the system of equations (4.2) we get

















-v(R+T )_ Tr .
+ e F. (T.) / e
vtF(t)dt .
-v(M+T.)_ Tr ...
B(T.,T ) = (1-e 1 F.(T.)) / e VtF (t)dt
1 r l l a r
-v(M+T )_ T i _
+ e
r VV / e VtF (t)dt . (4.5)x
-v(M+T.)_ -v(R+T )
C(T.,T ) = 1 - e 1 F.(T.) - e r F (T ) +i' r li r r
-v(M+R+T.+T ) -v(R+T ) i
[F (T) - F. (T.)]- (1-e r F (T )) / v'VV(t)d1




F. (T) / ve
Vr
F (t)dt . (4.6)
i i r
If there are optimal finite inspection intervals T., T , they
must satisfy for x = i and r.
A'(T.,T )/A(T.,T ) = B*(T.,T )/B(T.,T ]
x i r i r x i r l r
= C'(T .,T )/C(T ,T ) (4.7)
2C A. JL J_ XT
where
A! = 3A/9T. and A' = 9A/9T , etc,
l l r r
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In the special case where the extra time for a repair is
zero and the lifetime of the unit is the same whether an in-
spection or a repair has just taken place, we can show that











<") = F (*) and T. = T = T,
so (4.3) becomes
V(T) = A(T)/C(T) (4.8)
where
T
A(T) = / e~vtF(t)dt (4.9)







Optimal inspection time T* is finite and
V(T*) = F(T*)/v(eVM - F(T*)).
Proof
At a local maximum or minimum V (T) = which implies
h(T) = A'(T)C(T) - C'(T)A(T) = since C(T) 2 > 0, where
h(T) = e






— vTh(0) is positive and though h(°°) = notice that h(T) = e g(T)
and as T * °°, g(T) < 0. This shows that T = °° is a minimum
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turning point and that there is a finite turning point which
is a maximum.
We could repeat the whole analysis for the continuous time
analogue of the model where we ignore successfully-dealt-with
initiating events, or at least do not consider them inspec-


















The same analysis that led to (4.7) can be applied to (4.12) to
find the optimal T. and T . There is a difference in the
^ l r
special case when M=R, F.(-) =F (•) =F(-)/ T. =T =T




V(T) = D(T)/K(T) (4.13)
where
T
D(T) = / F(u)du (4.14)
and
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In this special case of Model 2, a sufficient condition for
S*, the optimal inspection interval to be finite is that
r(-) > _ (4.16)
1 + vye





2At a local maximum or minimum of V(T)
, V(T) = h(T)/K(T) =
where




- ( / F(u)du)ve~v(M+T) ( / f (u)eVUdu + F(0))) (4.17)
2Since K(T) > 0, the condition V'(T) = reduces to h(T) = 0.
Notice that h(0) = F(0) [l-e~ vM ] > but h («>) = 0. Thus to
insure the maximum is not at T = °°, we must show h 1 (T) is posi-
tive as T tends to infinity. Differentiating h with respect
to T, it follows that as T tends to infinity
m ? 2 -vM










b = £im ( / F(y)evydy)/F(T)evT . (4.19)
T+oo o
T
If F(T)e = exp(- / (r(t)-v)dt) -*• c as T •* « then b -> °°
and h*(°°) is positive; this certainly occurs if r(°°) > v. if
— vT ^ iF(T)e -* °° as T -* °° , then L'Hopitals Rule says
Thus
b = £im F( ^
)e
= = U- • (4.20)
T.00 vF(T)evT - f(T)eVT V
" r(oo)
h' (T) -> -r(°°) (1 + e VMvy) + v 2ye vM r( 7
}
v • (4.21)r- / i- v _ r(°°)
Y)TSince we are assuming F(T)e + » we have r(°°) £ v. If
r (oo) < v then on checking when (4.21) is positive we get (4.16).
Finally if r(~) = v, then b = °° and h ' (T) is still positive at T =
As an example suppose F(t) = we , t > so the unit has
exponential lifetime with a probability 1-w of instantaneous
failure, then the optimal inspection time T satisfies
-(v+A)T rA . ,_ , . . -vM -AT , , ,, x -(v+A)T , -vM AT, ne [ A-vw) - (2v+A) e e +v(w+l)e + ve e ] =
(4.22)
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and the condition (4.16) that guarantees a finite solution to
this equation is A > v(l - we )
.
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5. TWO- UPSTATE MODEL
Model 7
We extend Model 2 of Section 3 to allow the unit to be in
either one of two different up states: 1-up and 2-up, which
have different failure rates. Let s., i = 1,2 be the proba-
bility of remaining in state i next period given that it is in
state i this period, and 1-s . is the probability it will fail
in the next period. This model is intended to describe the
situation in which a repair might only correct minor faults
that caused the failure and not the underlying problem, which
caused and will continue to cause these faults. We take as our
state space S = ip,g) |0 £ p 1, <_ g <_ °°}, where p is the
belief that the unit is up, and g is the ratio of the probability
the unit is in the 1-up state to the probability it is in the
2-up state. Thus in the state (p,g) the belief the unit is
down, in the 1-up state and the 2-up state are respectively
i-P/ gp/g+i/ p/g+i.
We assume that after a repair the unit is in state (r,w) and
define a = s,/s„, where without loss of generality, we assume
s, s„. The occurrence of a successfully-dealt-with initiating
event is treated as an inspection which takes no time. Let
V(p,g) be the maximum extra number of periods under the best
inspection policy until a catastrophic event, than if there was
no standby unit (i.e., same definition as in Section 2)
.
Again, Denardo ' s results [4] guarantee the optimal policy to
be a deterministic one, it satisfies the optimality equation
38
V(p,g) = max{W
1 (p,g) / W2 (p,g), W 3 (p,g)} (5.1)
W
1 (p / g) = P + (l-3)V(s 2p(ag+l)/(g+l) ,ag) + 3pV(i,g)
W
2 (p,g) = p(1-3)
M
v(i,g) +(l-p)(l-6) R v(r,w)
W
3 (p,g) = (l-e)
R V(r,w)
The assumption is that an inspection affects the probability
the unit is up, but not the ratio between the two up states,
whereas a repair always returns the unit to the state (r,w)
.
(s~p(ag+l) /g+1 ,ag) is the Bayesian updated belief of the state
(p,g) , using the fact that no initiating event occurred. The
optimal policy for this model is given as follows.
Theroem 5.1.
The optimal policy is given by a function p*(g) and a
number g* so in state (p,g) , it does nothing if p > p*(g)
,
inspects if p £ p*(g) , g > g*, and repairs if p <_ p*(g) / g < g*
Proof
As in Theorem 3.1 an inductive proof on the iterates of
value iteration proves that V(p,g) is convex and non-decreasing
in p and non-decreasing in g. Now define
Wg = (p|V(p,g) > W, (p,g)}; then the linearity of W and V? 3 and
the convexity of V in p guarantees Wg is convex, just as in
Theorem 3.1. V(0,g) = V(0,g') since if p = there is only




(l-3) N V(r,w) . (5.2)
By definition V(r,w) > and if V(0 / g) = W,(0,g) = (l-3)V(0,ag) =
(l-3)V(0,g) then V(0 / g) = 0, and hence e Wg. Thus Wg = [0,p*(g)]
and result holds, g* satisfies (1-|3) M V(i,g*) = (1-3) N V(r,w);
and since V(i,g) is non-decreasing in g this gives the
division between inspection and repair.
Again we can rewrite the state space in terms of the number
of periods since the last inspection and the last repair. Let
S = { (m,n) | <_ m <_ n °°} where (m,n) is the state which is m
periods since the end of the last inspection or the end of
repair if it followed from the last inspections and n non-
inspection periods since the last repair. The state (m,n) is
equivalent to g = aw,
s





r(anw+l)/(an"mw+l) if n = m
If we define p(m,n) according to (5.3), the optimality equation
for this state space is
p(m,n) + (l-3)V(m+l,n+l) + gp (m,n) V( ,n)
V(m,n) max/ p(m,n) (1-3) M V(0,N) + (l-p(m,n) ) (l-g) R V(0,0)
(1-3) R V(0,0) (5.4)
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Theorem 5.1 can be reinterpreted for this state space.
Corollary 5.1.
The optimal policy is given by a function m*(n) and a
number n* so that at (m,n) , do nothing if m < m* (n) ; inspect
if m > m*(n)
,
n > n*; repair if m > m*(n) , n <_ n* . Notice if
i
_> r, n* = and we always inspect.
Again we can use value iterations on a finite state approxi-
mation of the Markov decision model given by (5.4) (see White
[22] for the bounds). This gives us the results found in Table 5
namely the optimal periods for inspections, counting from the
last repair.
Note that the optimal inspection pattern appears to have
short inter-inspection times just after a repair, which gradually
increase to long inspection times, provided the system continues
to be found up upon inspection. Hazardous inspection (i small)
has a more drastic effect on the expected time to a catastrophic
failure than similar changes in r, or s. and s„.
Model 8
As in Section 3, we could also model the situation in which
the information acquired from successfully-dealt-with initiating
events is ignored. Then 3, i, s-., s 2 , M, R are still defined
as in Model 7, but immediately after an inspection or repair
the time to the next inspection or repair is determined, and
which kind it will be. Immediately after a repair suppose the
unit has probability r, , r respectively of being in the 1-up
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repair, and immediately after an inspection, where it is important
to know the number of operating periods n since the last repair.
We denote the maximum expected times until a catastrophic event
at these decision points as V , V. respectively. As in Model 4^
r ' 1, n ^ 2
we can write down the optimality equation connecting these values:
V
r
= max / L(r,W
r
) + (1-f (r,W
r
) ) ( ( (1- (1-3
)
R




















) ( (l-(l-3) /$) + (1-3) v'± T )










) ) ((l-(l-3) /S + (1-3) V
r
)








T . T .
+ (1-3)V n+T + (l-i(n) 1 s 1 1 ' n -i(n) 2 s 2 1 ' ni,n
- f(i(n),T. ) ((l-(l-3) R/3 + d-3) R V ) (5.5)




, l-r 1 -r 2 ) . If p
= (p
]
_/P 2 /P 3 ) where px is the
probability of being in the 1-up state, p 2 is the probability of
being in the 2~up state, and p 3 is the probability of being
down, then
T-l T-2








- p 9 V ((l-(l-3) T "k_1 ) d-s k ) (5.6)
k=l
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is the expected time until a catastrophic failure in first T
periods starting in state p.
n . nir,s, ir
2
S


















after inspection n operating periods after last repair, while
f(p_,T) (l-3)f (p_,T-l) +p
1
3(l-s^ X ) +p 2 3d-S2~
1
) + 3p 3 (5.7)
is the probability there has been a catastrophic failure within
T periods, starting in state p. Again, the general results of
Markov renewal programming [7] show that the only possible
optimal policies are tt (W) , i.e., repair every W, or tt.{T ,T, , T„ , . . . }
which is inspect T periods after a repair, and T, periods
after the k ' inspection after a repair. In order to find the
optimal policy it is easier to work with V = V 1/3 again,
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It appears somewhat difficult to solve (5.9) and (5.10) as we
have an infinite set of equations. However, we can assume for
all t, > N, for some N, V. is approximately constant, sinceK - i,i k
if a large number of periods have passed since the last repair,
with no intervening failure, it is a good approximation to
assume the unit is in the better of the two up states. This
enables us to solve these equations using the bisection method
reviewed in Thomas [19 . The method depends on the fact that if we
substitute V = c in the R.H.S. of (5.9) and (5.10) we can work
back and solve for V on the L.H.S. of (5.9) . If c is the
correct value of V , the L.H.S. of (5.9) is c, but if c > V ,
it follows easily that the L.H.S. of (5.9) will be greater than
c, while if c < v it will be smaller than c. Using this as
r
the basis of the bisection method and taking all inspections
more than 50 periods after a repair as the same, we get the
forms of the approximately optimal policies found in Table 6;
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The parameters in the comparable continuous time model of






= 0.5, M = 0.035 and R = 0.07. The corresponding
best policies under the "short-long" inspection rule of Section
2 with inter-inspection times restricted to being multiplies
of a week are as follows:
Table 7
Best expected time to





The difference in policies for Case III results from the
fact that the discrete time model allows a decision of repair
without inspection. The differences in the policies for cases
I, II, and IV come about because the continuous time model only
allows inspection periods of two different lengths whereas
the optimal policy in the discrete time model goes gradually
from the length of the inspection period just after a repair
to an asymptotic inspection period if the inspections are
successful. However, subject to its restrictions, the policy
of the continuous time model is comparable to that of the dis-
crete time model.
I 0.9 0.9 1 (4 times) , 2
II 0.9 0.5 1 (2 times) , 3
II 0.5 0.9 3 (1, time) , 1
IV 0.5 0.5 3 (1 time) , °°
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The differences between the best expected times to a
catastrophic event in the two models results from the discreti-
zation of time in Model 8. If the time interval in the discrete
time model of Case I is taken to be 1/10 week instead of 1 week
with the resulting change of parameters 3 = .01, i = 0.9,
r
1
= 0.6, r = 0.3, s = .996, s
2
= .95, M = 0.35, R = 0.7,
then the optimal policy is inspect 7 periods after a repair,
and if up, then 8 periods later, then 9, 11, 13, 16, 18 and
20 periods and the expected time until catastrophic failure is
626.0 periods. In the original time scale this is a time of
62.6 weeks. Note that the difference between the expected time
to a catastrophic event is now small for the two models. This
suggests that the policy that was proposed in Section 2, while
not optimal, is a good one.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions can be drawn about the form of
the optimal policy, by studying the models in this paper.
1) If the failure rate of the system increases with age,
then the inspection intervals should decrease, and do. Numeri-
cal examples based on Model 1 have borne this out. The model
calculations suggest optimal intervals based on the underlying
parameters
.
2) If there is only one state the unit can be in when it
is 'up', and the probability of being up, i, is the same after
each inspection and the probability of being up after a repair
is also a constant r, then the optimal policy is to have one
'short' inspection interval after a repair, and a 'longer'
inspection interval always thereafter (i > r) or else to repair
at fixed intervals with no inspection (r considerably larger
than i) . The 'longer' inspection interval must always be at least as
long as the 'short' initial inspection interval.
3) The results of 1) and 2) hold whether or not successfully-deal
with initiating events are considered as a type of inspection.
However, there are considerable differences in the actual in-
spection periods for these two cases.
4) In order for the optimal inspection problem to require
several 'short' inspection intervals followed by longer ones
it is necessary to assume the unit can be in more than one 'up'
state with different failure rates. In this case there is
not an abrupt jump from 'short' inspection intervals to 'long',
but a gradual increase in the inspection interval. However,
49
there is a suggestion that a policy comparable to the optimal
one in which there is a sharp jump between short inspections
and long ones, will give the expected time to a catastrophic
event that is close to that achieved by the optimal policy.
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